INTRODUCTION
Faced with mounting international insecurity, in 1937 Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave his famous "Quarantine Speech," likening the rise of fascism to an outbreak of world lawlessness. "When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread," FDR remarked, "the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease."
1 Fearful of becoming embroiled in another world war, the United States was slow to shed its isolationism, only gradually increasing the provision 1 For the text and audio of FDR's speech, see http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/us/fdr1937.html (last visited Jan.
29, 2005). D. Smith Global Quarantine February 2, 2005
2 of arms to its allies and restricting exports to the Axis powers. 2 When war finally came at Pearl
Harbor, Nazi and Japanese forces had expanded like a cancer throughout Europe and Asia, requiring far more than a quarantine to eliminate the malignancy.
Today the world confronts another danger that is on the brink of developing into an epidemic: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD 3 ). With the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, the clandestine nuclear progress of North Korea and Iran, and over a dozen nuclear-capable states waiting indecisively on the sidelines, the world has arrived at what is fairly described as a "nuclear tipping point," where a few decisions to produce WMD could spark a cascade of proliferation. 4 Such an outcome could have some stabilizing effects through the functioning of nuclear deterrence, but it would also create an expanding supply of material for catastrophic terrorism as well as raise the stakes between adversaries with fingers on the WMD trigger when conflicts do occur. Since convincing nascent WMD-states to disarm is an uncertain prospect, 5 I argue that the United States and the international community should lay the 2 
See ROBERT A. DIVINE, RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT: AMERICAN ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II (1979). For instance,
although the United States instituted a "moral embargo" against Japan as early as July 1938, it was not until July 1941 that it imposed a complete embargo. 3 Use of the collective term WMD carries the risk of overlooking important distinctions among nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. At the same time, WMD is a simple, commonly understood, and analytically useful shorthand. I will note differences among the types of WMD when relevant, but will primarily focus on nuclear weapons. 4 See THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT: WHY STATES RECONSIDER THEIR NUCLEAR CHOICES (Kurt M. Campbell et al. Unfortunately, international law does not currently authorize such a system, forbidding only WMD transfers made to non-state actors. 7 Thus, I propose that the United Nations Security
Council, in conjunction with the International Maritime Organization, pass a resolution construing the deliberate proliferation of such weapons-to states and non-state actors alike-as a threat to the peace and an inherent act of aggression. A U.N. interdiction commission assessing requests to intercept weapons in transit, working in concert with the Proliferation Security
Initiative, 8 can then enforce this mandate.
Toward these ends, this article aims to explain why a global quarantine is needed, why it is legitimate under international law, and how it can be established in an effective and ideally multilateral manner. Part I assesses the legal and institutional options currently available to the United States in combating the proliferation of WMD, briefly analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each. It concludes that the inherent deficiencies of existing arms control tools require the creation of a new regime centered upon a robust interdiction authority. Part II then explores how the international community can both legally justify a global quarantine upon imperative that U.S. negotiators put forward a viable package of incentives to test the willingness of Pyongyang and
Tehran to disarm. If North Korea and Iran rebuff these proposals, it will be yet further proof that they are determined to gain a fully-fledged WMD capability. 6 Inspiration to apply the quarantine concept to this topic is drawn partly from Ruth Wedgwood 
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4 principles of self-defense, and practically integrate it into existing institutions. This article thus represents the first effort to propose a comprehensive interdiction regime rooted in maritime law and the concept of confiscating contraband materials in self-defense.
I. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS TO COMBAT WMD PROLIFERATION
The proliferation of WMD is a multi-layered phenomenon, fueled by global trade, arms sales, indigenous research and development, and covert transfers to non-state actors. Defending against such a complex threat, in turn, involves a wide array of legal, institutional, and strategic mechanisms. States can adopt export controls to reduce proliferation generally, issue threats to deter the use of WMD, build defenses to minimize the damage from a WMD attack, take military action to disarm a potential adversary, or police the channels proliferators use to exchange
weapons. This Part will analyze these frameworks, concluding that although each has merit, interdiction in particular is emerging as a crucial but legally underdeveloped option.
A. Export Controls
Some observers recommend strengthening export controls to keep sensitive technologies off the international market, thereby restraining the ability of states to produce WMD. 9 While effective to an extent, the trouble is that increasingly proliferation is fueled by "dual-use" items, 9 See, e. Even if it were possible to reach international agreement over how to restrict dual-use items and regulate fissile material, the reality is that we live in a post-proliferation world and so in a sense the horse is out of the barn. North Korea is effectively a de facto nuclear state, likely to be in possession of sufficient reprocessed plutonium to create half a dozen bombs and hard at 10 For instance, in 2000 Japan imposed export controls on its PlayStation2 video game system because it could process high quality images quickly, a feature much in demand for advanced missile guidance systems. PATRICK M. 34 Granted, an outright invasion would probably uproot the WMD development of both Iran and North Korea, but in the wake of the war in Iraq, this appears politically, militarily, and financially unlikely for the near future.
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E. Interdiction
Given these grim conclusions-the failure of export controls, the inadequacy of deterrence, the uncertainty of defenses, and the impracticality of counterforce-it is crucial that the United States have robust interdiction capabilities to prevent the transfer of WMD. Libya with a shipment of uranium enrichment parts, which some observers believe was responsible for Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's decision to accept inspections and disarm.
Recognizing this need, President
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The PSI is meant to "be consistent with existing national legal authorities and international law and frameworks." 38 Generally, while a state has complete jurisdiction over its airspace, territory, and internal waters, its authority diminishes in relation to the distance from its coastline. 39 Under the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, vessels on the high seas 40 "are subject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly. Realistically, if the United States were to receive intelligence reports indicating that a North Korean ship was transporting a completed nuclear device on the high seas, the lack of consent would surely not be a barrier to its decision to interdict. This poses a gap between the stated objectives of the PSI and its legal authority to achieve them. The threat posed by WMD is simply too great to allow a pocket of immunity under UNCLOS to prevent all interdiction efforts without consent, regardless of the magnitude of the threat. The notion that some states should profit from lending the use of their flag as a shield against inspection is likewise untenable in an age of WMD. Instead, there should be a global norm against WMD proliferation that is allinclusive, holding any state that transports WMD responsible, regardless of nationality. The rest of this article will focus on achieving this goal through a global quarantine. This is not meant to imply that interdiction will suffice as an exclusive or even primary strategy to combat WMD. Interdiction missions require extraordinary intelligence, timing and coordination to be successful. Detecting plutonium is incredibly difficult given its faint radiation 47 
II. A NEW APPROACH: GLOBAL QUARANTINE
Given that the provisions of UNCLOS will not support a robust interdiction regime, the key issue is how to establish a legal foundation for a global quarantine against WMD. This Part examines how the doctrine of self-defense provides conceptual justification for a quarantine, and then explores how to integrate these principles into a functioning institutional framework.
A. The Evolving Law of Self-Defense
Article 51, 51 the U.N. Charter provision concerning self-defense, has become highly controversial, particularly given the events surrounding the U. Article 39 alone, then, is insufficient to deal with fleeting windows of opportunity of the kind associated with interdiction. Without a more robust and streamlined process, rather than risk delay and dissension at the Security Council, the United States would probably act on its own (or with other PSI participants), claiming a rationale of self-defense. 91 To prevent this outcome, the United Nations should provide an avenue for multilateral interdiction efforts, adopting a brightline rule against the transfer of WMD. Such a reform is in accord with the U.N. Charter because the proliferation of WMD is not defensive; rather, it is a form of aggression against world order that merits a limited form of protection in the same vein. When a state elects not merely to build but to transfer WMD, placing other states in danger, it sacrifices the sovereignty its ships and planes would traditionally enjoy in international waters and airspace. In a sense, even though there may not be a traditional state of belligerency, the United Nations should treat WMD as international contraband, permitting search and seizure when there is reasonable suspicion of 90 Id. at 63. 91 See infra Part II.B.3. their presence. 92 To be sure, the potential for an abuse of interdiction power will remain, even when carried out multilaterally. Establishing a global quarantine in principle will not eliminate the problems of proof surrounding authorization of interdiction operations in practice, but it is a step in the right direction. The next Section will attempt to map out a potential path for those steps to take.
B. Building Blocks of a Global Quarantine
An effective global quarantine system will require an integrated framework of initiatives, supplying both the legal foundation to establish a global norm against WMD proliferation and the needed capabilities to carry out interdiction missions. There are doubtless numerous combinations of means to achieve this end, but this Section will focus on those I believe are most promising: first, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) can articulate general principles forbidding the transfer of WMD on the high seas; second, the U.N. Security Council can pass a resolution binding the international community to these rules, thereby extending Resolution 1540; finally, the PSI can enforce these provisions, acquiring a U.N. mandate as needed. These three proposals are not mutually exclusive, since the PSI can always act independently as a last resort, but they would ideally operate complementarily.
International Maritime Organization
The London-based IMO, established in 1948 to promote maritime safety, has adopted about forty conventions and protocols since its inception. 
Proliferation Security Initiative
Neither the IMO nor the U.N. has independent enforcement mechanisms, so the ideal entity to serve this function, preferably in conjunction with a Security Council interdiction committee, is the PSI. An integrative approach would bestow much needed legitimacy on U.S.-led actions and would also provide potentially essential multinational cooperation in tasks such as freezing assets of WMD traffickers and providing access to air space and foreign bases. either attempt to assert a broader right of interdiction under the doctrine of self-defense, which it has thus far been reluctant to do, or it must seek authority through international institutions, as outlined in this section.
It may be that the United States has to "go it alone" in the event that the Security Council does not authorize an interdiction mission that U.S. leaders believe is vital to national security.
Even the U.N. High-level Panel acknowledged that the Security Council "may well need to be prepared to be much more proactive on [threats to international peace and security,] taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past." 122 If the Security Council fails to act or is stymied by a stubborn dissenting veto, the United States will have to seek alternative authority.
One option is to turn to regional organizations, perhaps built on the PSI framework, and invoke Considering the politically sensitive nature of interdiction operations, and the need for international cooperation in such missions, it is crucial that the United States do everything it can to avoid this situation and maximize the possibility that action can be taken through the Security Council. 128 A sensible starting point is to ensure that all interdiction decisions are based upon whether the action is a last resort; (4) whether the means are proportional to the threat; and (5) whether there is a reasonable chance of success.
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Given the immense danger posed by WMD, the relative lack of ulterior motives for interdiction, the inability to defend against WMD use, and the focused nature of interdiction missions, these criteria should not be as hostile to interdiction as they may first appear. They are specific enough, however, to be preferable to a cost-benefit framework that boils down all the variables to the question of whether a state believes that the expected harm of a potential attack has reached an unacceptable level. 131 One appropriate sliding variable might be the nature of the WMD or precursor material, with nuclear weapons requiring a lesser degree of threat/imminence than chemical weapons or dual-use items. 132 Overall, these criteria should serve as a guiding principle for any actor or institution deciding on interdiction, be it the United States, the PSI, or the Security Council interdiction committee. . 131 See Yoo, supra note 26, at 757. 132 See PERKOVICH, supra note 9, at 38-39.
Even before FDR applied the term to international affairs, states used quarantines to protect themselves from threats on the high seas, requiring the temporary detention of incoming ships and sailors to ensure that they did not pass on the plague or other infectious diseases.
Today, since a local system of quarantine is impractical with the flood of international trade and travel, the quarantine must take on a global character, aiming to prevent the spread of WMD altogether. This article began by showing why a new framework is needed, analyzing how export controls, deterrence, defenses, or even more active disarmament measures will not easily contain the WMD threat. Part II.A then examined the legal principles behind a global quarantine, demonstrating that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter rests upon an evolving notion of self-defense that may need to adapt in order to respond to catastrophic but non-imminent threats. Finally, this article explored the various international institutions available to serve as a framework for a global quarantine, concluding that the IMO can articulate principles which the Security Council can extend and universalize, relying on the PSI for enforcement.
As I acknowledge in Part II.B, this article does not claim to identify the sole path for achieving a global quarantine. Its main purpose is to demonstrate the urgency and sound legal basis for a quarantine, as well as offer some initial ideas for how to begin making it a reality.
Some observers may contend that my proposals go too far and there is only a modest chance that they will gain widespread approval. It may be that IMO members will refuse to make reforms to the SUA Convention, and that Resolution 1540 represents the furthest the Security Council is willing to go in countering proliferation. As Part II.B.3 reflects, though, in that event the default situation is ever-increasing reliance on the PSI, since the threat posed by WMD will not go away However, as explained in Part II.A, the best way to maintain the relevance of international institutions like the Security Council is to frame them so that the United States and others have an incentive to use them. If the U.N. cannot expedite interdiction claims through a special committee, there is little chance at all that PSI nations will turn to it for authorization.
Other critics may object that these proposals do not go far enough. As mentioned in Part I.E, since interdiction relies heavily on intelligence capabilities and good fortune, some might conclude that forcible disarmament is the only reliable solution. Especially if a series of WMD terrorists attacks were to occur, I fear that victimized states would believe they had no other choice but to eliminate all WMD supplies beyond their allies. Given the incredible risk and likely damage from such a course, as outlined in Part I.D, I believe a global quarantine offers a middle ground approach with the best matching of ends and means. To avoid leaving interdiction to the United States alone, and to forestall more drastic disarmament measures, the world community should join together to draw a clear line in the sand, on the water, and in the air forbidding all forms of WMD transfer.
